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Abstract
In this paper we consider a simple intertemporal economy in which immi-
grants, if admitted, bring heterogeneous amounts of capital. We show that
under certain conditions there is a level of immigration which maximizes the
economy’s capital-labor ratio, and that this level of immigration is the pre-
ferred choice of a majority of the economy’s citizens. We then characterize, in
an overlapping generations setting, the dynamics of capital accumulation and
immigration policy, which can include multiple steady state equilibria and a sen-
sitivity of immigration levels to changes in the economy’s technology growth
rate.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The objective of this study is to try to understand what motivates various countries–
sometimes quite similar countries–to choose alternative levels of immigration. For
example, Canada and the United States, two countries that are similar in many re-
spects, appear to have very diﬀerent criteria for admitting immigrants. Canada gives
high priority to individuals who have valuable skills, or larger amounts of ﬁnancial
resources, whereas the US chooses to put more weight on the family relations of ex-
isting residents. By comparison, these countries are quite diﬀerent from Australia–
another industrialized country–which for most of the 20th century has admitted few
immigrants, those admitted being almost exclusively European. Since 1971, however,
Australia has admitted a tremendous quantity of immigrants, and a large volume of
those are from Asia.
Among European countries, through the 1980’s France, Spain and Italy have
admitted a very modest number of immigrants, whereas throughout this same period
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium have admitted roughly three times as many
immigrants, as a fraction of their respective populations.
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1In this paper, we adopt a political economy approach to looking at the issue of
immigration. In particular, we examine the economic determinants of natives’ pref-
erences over the level of immigration and–assuming a majority-voting framework–
the translation of those preferences into policies. Our model is a dynamic one–
households in the economy make consumption-savings decisions which, in conjunc-
tion with levels of immigration, determine the path of the economy’s capital-labor
ratio.
A key feature of the environment is that potential immigrants are heterogeneous
in terms of their initial wealth, or capital. This heterogeneity turns out to have im-
portant consequences for the economy’s policy decision. The preferences of natives in
our economy are, in a sense, ‘polarized’–depending on the extent to which a native
is more or less reliant on either capital or labor income he or she will prefer admission
policies which either minimize or maximize the economy’s capital-labor ratio. When
immigrants are homogeneous, this implies an ‘all-or-none’ policy choice–the econ-
omy will either admit everyone or no one, depending on whether the ‘capital-rich’ or
‘capital-poor’ are in the majority.1 When immigrants are heterogeneous, the polar-
ization of natives’ preferences can still translate into an ‘interior’ policy–something
between keeping everyone out and letting everyone in.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section lays out the basic fea-
tures of the economy in a two-period example. We show that heterogeneity of immi-
grants in terms of their initial capital (together with a simple rule for determining
the characteristics of a given quantity of immigrants to be admitted) can lead to an
‘interior’ equilibrium under majority voting. This result obtains under certain con-
ditions on the distributions of immigrant and native wealth–loosely, under certain
sets of demographics–and we try to provide some rough quantitative feel for the
likelihood of the result obtaining in practice, for a country such as the US vis-à-vis
the less-developed world. We also oﬀer a comparison between our model and that
of Benhabib [1], which is closely related to our work. As we argue, our work is both
as i m p l i ﬁcation (along one dimension) and a generalization (along others) of Ben-
habib’s; we also try to make a case that real-world demographics favor the direction
in which we’ve simpliﬁed.
In the next section, we then extend our two-period intuition to an overlapping
generations model with two-period-lived agents. In the context of this many-period
model, we characterize the dynamics of immigration and capital accumulation, and
illustrate that multiple steady state equilibria are possible. Also, the paths of im-
migration and capital accumulation depend on the growth rate of exogenous techno-
logical progress–with faster growth rates leading to larger immigrant inﬂows. This
suggests the possibility that some of the variation in observed immigration to coun-
tries such as the US may be due, at least in part, simply to changes in the technology
growth rate.
2A t w o - p e r i o d m o d e l
2.1 The basic set-up
In this section, we develop the intuition for the behavior of our model economy in the
context of a simple two-period model in which natives decide how many immigrants
to admit, then divide their ﬁrst-period wealth between consumption and savings;
immigrants, if admitted, arrive in the second period, at which time production takes
place using labor and capital (savings of natives plus endowments of immigrants) as
inputs. The key to our voting results is that when immigrants diﬀer in their holdings
1And, depending on what ratio of capital to labor a typical immigrants brings.
2of capital, and an economy follows a rule of accepting immigrants in descending order
of wealth, there will (under some restrictions on the model’s parameters) be a level
of immigration which maximizes the second-period capital-labor ratio. This level of
immigration turns out to be a local maximum or a local minimum of every native’s
lifetime utility. When the distribution of initial wealth among natives is such that
the wealth of the median native lies below a particular critical value, then the level
of immigration which maximizes the second-period capital-labor ratio is the unique
preferred policy for at least half of the native population. We also provide some
rough quantitative evidence suggesting that, at least for a country like the US, it’s
reasonable to expect the suﬃcient condition just described to hold, though–as will
become clear–the condition is not simply about native demographics, but also about
the demographics of the pool of prospective immigrants.
We will ﬁrst lay out the basic features of the two-period model, then describe
natives’ preferences over alternative second-period capital-labor ratios. We then
analyze the relationship between capital-labor ratios and immigration policies–in
particular, describing conditions under which a capital-labor-ratio-maximizing pol-
icy exists–and then show how natives’ preferences over capital-labor ratios translate
into preferences over immigration policies.
We now proceed to describe the model. The economy in this section lasts for
two periods. The population in the ﬁrst period consists of a measure one of natives.
Each native is endowed with some amount of initial capital, which may be consumed
or saved for period two. Capital which a native saves for the second-period is rented
to the economy’s production sector at a competitively determined real rental rate r.
Each native also has a unit of labor to supply in the second period, and that unit earns
a competitively determined real wage of w. The production sector is characterized
by a Cobb-Douglas production function F (K,L)=AKαL1−α. The second-period
labor input, L, consists of the unit labor supplies of natives and immigrants, and
the second-period capital stock consists of native savings plus capital brought by
immigrants. Natives may diﬀer in their initial capital-holdings, the total mass of
n a t i v e si so n e ,a n d¯ k denotes average initial native capital.
We assume that all natives have the same time-additive, logarithmic preferences
over consumption in the two periods. The problem faced by a native with initial
capital k is
max
s log(k − s)+β log(rs+ w),
where β ∈ (0,1) is the native’s utility discount factor. The solution to the native’s










Aggregating savings over natives (at a given wage-rental ratio w/r)g i v e st h et o t a l
amount of capital supplied by natives, at the given prices, for production in the
second period.
Immigrants, if admitted, arrive in the second period. Let M denote the number
of immigrants admitted. Immigrants arrive with a unit of labor to supply plus
some amount of capital. Let κ(M) denote the total amount of capital among M
immigrants, so aggregate native saving plus κ(M) equals the total input of capital,
K,i np e r i o dt w o .
Implicitly, positing κ(M) means assuming the economy has some rule for deciding
on the order in which heterogeneous immigrants are to be admitted. We will assume
that the economy follows a ‘wealthiest-immigrants-ﬁrst’ rule, so that κ0 (M)–the
3increment to total immigrant capital from a marginal immigrant–is decreasing in
M.2
For a given value of M, describing the economy’s equilibrium is straightforward.
Let ξ denote the second-period capital-labor ratio. Given a period-two wage-rental









Here, we have used the facts that, with a unit mass of natives, aggregate saving
is identical to average saving, and, with a linear saving rule, average saving is the
saving of the native with the average initial endowment of capital. On the other hand,
from the Cobb-Douglas production technology, a capital-labor ratio of ξ implies a
















All other quantities, as wells as prices, then follow directly from the equilibrium ξ.
In this economy, the only eﬀect of immigration on natives’ welfare comes through
the eﬀect of immigration on the equilibrium capital-labor ratio, and the consequent
eﬀect this has on factor prices. Hence, before thinking about the majority-rule equi-
librium level of immigration, it is useful to think about natives preferences in terms
of the economy’s second period capital-labor ratio.




Substituting this expression, the expression for the wage-rental ratio (2), and the
savings decision rule (1) into a typical native’s utility function gives the following
indirect utility function deﬁned over ξ ∈ (0,+∞) for a native with initial capital k:
vk (ξ)=( 1+β)log(αk +( 1− α)ξ) − β (1 − α)log(ξ).
It’s straightforward to show that vk (ξ) is ‘∪-shaped’, with
lim
ξ→0
vk (ξ) = lim
ξ→+∞
vk (ξ)=+ ∞,





2Benhabib [1] examines the case where there is a distribution of immigrant capital-holdings, say
F (k), with associated density f (k). A policy in Benhabib’s model is a choice of ‘cut-oﬀ’v a l u e s ,
l and u ≥ l, such that the economy admits all immigrants with capital-holdings in the interval
[l,u].O u rκ(M) corresponds to a restriction u =+ ∞. Below, we will argue that our ‘wealthiest
ﬁrst’ assumption is not particularly restrictive: in a more general setting, such as Benhabib’s, the
native population would be polarized between a ‘poorest ﬁrst’ and ‘wealthiest ﬁrst’ policy, with
the relatively poorer part of the native population (and presumably a majority) preferring the
‘wealthiest ﬁrst’ alternative.
4Now, suppose that feasible immigration policies correspond to an interval [ξ∗,ξ
∗]
of second-period capital-labor ratios. Hold oﬀ momentarily on the possibility that
two policies lead to the same value of ξ–or, equivalently, imagine that ξ is the issue
to be decided. It follows from the ∪-shape of natives’ utilities over ξ that if a native
has initial capital k such that his minimum point, ξk, lies below the lower bound ξ∗,
then that native prefers the upper bound ξ
∗ to any other ξ ∈ [ξ∗,ξ
∗].C o n v e r s e l y ,i f
k is such the native’s minimum point lies above the upper bound ξ
∗, then the native
prefers the lower bound ξ∗.I f k is such that ξk is in between the upper and lower
bounds, i.e., ξ∗ ≤ ξk ≤ ξ
∗, then the native’s most preferred point could be either
ξ∗ or ξ
∗. One can show that there is a critical value of k–call it kc–such that
natives with k<k c prefer the higher ξ
∗ while natives with k>k c prefer the lower
ξ∗.3 Consequently, if the median level of initial native capital is less than the critical
value kc, a majority of natives prefer the higher capital-labor ratio ξ
∗.4 Thus, if there
is a unique level of immigration which produces the maximal capital-labor ratio ξ
∗,
that policy will be a majority-rule equilibrium.
What is going on here is that a native who is relatively poor (i.e.,o n ew h o s e
k is low) would prefer a high value of ξ, because this would imply a higher wage.
Conversely, a native who is relatively rich (i.e., one whose k is high) would prefer
al o wv a l u eo fξ, because this would imply a higher return to capital. If there are
enough natives who are relatively poor, a majority of natives will favor a higher value
of ξ.
2.2 The K/L-maximizing level of immigration
In this section, we turn to consider conditions on κ(M) which imply that ξ
∗ or
ξ∗ are attained by unique policies. We assume that feasible values of M lie in an
interval [0,M max]. Using the form of the savings rule (1), the expression (3) for the















Solving for ξ gives:
ξ =
αβ¯ k + α(1 + β)κ(M)
1+αβ + α(1 + β)M
≡ ξ(M).( 4 )
In the appendix, we prove the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that κ(M) is C2, strictly increasing and strictly concave on
the set (0,M max),w i t hκ(0) = 0.I fκ(M) is such that κ0 (0) > [αβ/(1 + αβ)]¯ k>
κ0 (Mmax), then there exists a unique M∗ ∈ (0,M max) which attains ξ
∗.A l s o , i f
κ(Mmax)/Mmax ≤ [αβ/(1+ αβ)]¯ k,t h e nM = Mmax attains ξ∗;o t h e r w i s e ,M =0
attains ξ∗.
The ﬁrst part states that concavity of κ(M), together with conditions on its
slope at M =0and M = Mmax, guarantee existence of a unique maximizer M∗.
The middle term in the inequality κ0 (0) > [αβ/(1 + αβ)]¯ k>κ0 (Mmax) is simply
the capital-labor ratio which would obtain absent immigration. Thus, the inequality
will hold if the marginal capital brought by the wealthiest immigrant exceeds the
3See the appendix for details.
4A sw ew i l ls e eb e l o w ,a s s u m i n gt h em e d i a nn a t i v ep r e f e r sξ∗ to ξ∗ amounts to a joint assumption
on all the parameters of the model. We think that it is a reasonable assumption, however, at least
for the case of a developed economy like the US vis-a-vis a large pool of potential immigrants who
are, on average, relatively quite poor.
5average amount per native person at M =0 , and if this average, in turn, exceeds
the marginal capital which would be brought by the poorest immigrant, were he or
she to be admitted. The second part of the proposition is simply about locating the
minimizer of ξ (M);s i n c eξ (M) turns out to be hump-shaped, this minimizer is at
either M =0or M = Mmax, depending on the average amount of capital of the
entire potential immigrant pool. In either case, let M∗ denote the value of M,e i t h e r
0 or Mmax, which attains ξ∗.
2.3 Natives’ preferences over immigration
Now, we turn to consider natives’ preferences over M.A sn o t e da b o v e ,i nt e r m so f
the economy’s next-period capital-labor ratio, the preferred point of any particular
native will be either ξ
∗ or ξ∗, depending on whether that native’s initial wealth lies
below or above the critical value kc. As we show in the appendix, the critical value














η ,( 5 )
where η = β (1− α)/(1 + β). Every native with k<k c prefers ξ
∗ to ξ∗–and so
prefers ξ
∗ to any alternative capital-labor ratio ξ. Hence, every native with k<k c
prefers immigration M∗ to any other M ∈ [0,M max]. Correspondingly, every native
with k>k c prefers immigration M∗ to any other M ∈ [0,M max],w h e r eM∗ is
whichever of the two values, either 0 or Mmax,a t t a i n sξ∗.
The majority rule outcome will depend on whether the median native capital-
holding, km, falls below kc or above kc. In the former case, M∗ will be a majority
rule outcome, while in the latter case it will be M∗. By a ‘majority rule outcome’
we mean the Nash equilibrium of the standard two-candidate competition for votes
with simultaneous announcement of platforms over the issue M. Natives’ preferences
violate single-peakedness, so that the median voter theorem doesn’t apply here. How-
ever, the fact that natives can be separated into two groups, with natives in each
group sharing a common most preferred point, implies that, for either candidate, an-
nouncing the policy preferred by the larger group is a best response to any platform
announced by one’s opponent, so that both candidates announcing the policy pre-
ferred by the majority forms a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. Excluding
the knife-edge case where km = kc, and assuming a continuous distribution of native
capital, the equilibrium policy is also clearly unique.
We record the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let kc be deﬁned as in (5), and assume κ(M) satisﬁes the same
set of assumptions as in Proposition 1. Then, if km <k c, M∗ is a majority-rule
equilibrium policy.






we can put a rough lower bound on the critical capital-holding kc. In the appendix,
we show:
Corollary 1 Suppose that km < ¯ k,a n dκ(M) satisﬁes the same set of assumptions





αβ¯ k + α(1 + β)κ(Mmax)
1+αβ + α(1 + β)Mmax
¶
≥ km,
6then M∗ is a majority-rule equilibrium policy.
It’s possible to get a feel for whether or not km would fall below the critical
bound kc in a reasonably parametrized model. To that end, let λ denote the ratio of
average potential immigrant capital to native capital–i.e., κ(Mmax)/Mmax = λ¯ k.
Then, case (a) from the corollary–in which simply having km ≤ ¯ k is suﬃcient to





A standard value for α, capital’s share in the production function is 0.30.T h ec h o i c e
of β depends implicitly on the length of period we are assuming. For example, a
period length of ten years would correspond (roughly) to a β of 0.7. For those
parameter values, we are in case (a) if the ratio of average potential immigrant
capital to average native capital exceeds 0.21/1.21 ∼ = 0.174.
If λ < αβ/(1 + αβ), we could turn to evaluate the approximate bound in part (b)
of the corollary. However, this bound–as we will see–turns out to be quite crude.
Using λ to again denote the ratio of average potential immigrant capital to average





αβ + α(1 + β)λMmax
1+αβ + α(1 + β)Mmax
¶
>k m/¯ k.
In the US, the ratio of median wealth to average wealth is on the order of 0.3, while the
ratio of median income to average income is on the order of 0.6.5 Does the expression
on the left side of the last inequality exceed 0.30 or 0.60 for reasonable parameters?
While α and β are fairly straightforward to calibrate, the choices of Mmax and λ–the
characteristics of the pool of potential immigrants–are more diﬃcult. For example,
the population of the rest of the world is roughly 22 times the population of the
US. World GDP per person is about one-ﬁfth US GDP per person, so we might take
0.2
1
0.3 as a rough estimate of λ.6 For those numbers, the expression on the left-hand
side of the last inequality is 0.1217, which is below the ball-park range [0.30,0.60] for
km/¯ k.
But is Mmax =2 2a reasonable size for the US’s pool of potential immigrants?
The model is missing a number of features–notably land and possible congestion
eﬀects–which would surely come into play at levels of immigration that high. If
we cut Mmax in half, to Mmax =1 1 , keeping λ =0 .2
1
0.3, the bound increases only
slightly to 0.1996–again less than 0.30.
The following table, however, records the exact critical values kc at values of
Mmax ranging from 5 to 20,a n dv a l u e so fλ ranging from 0.002 to 0.20. All fall above
the 0.30 threshold (which is approximately the ratio of US median wealth to US
mean wealth) and many fall above even the 0.60 threshold (which is approximately
the ratio of US median income to US mean income).
5See Díaz-Giménez, et al. [2].
6This assumes identical production technologies for the US and the rest of the world, so that
the ratio of per-person GDPs must equal the ratio of per-person capital stocks raised to the power
α =0 .3. Flipping this around, the ratio of per-person capital stocks must equal the ratio of per
capita GDPs raised to the α−1 =0 .3−1.
7λ
0.0020 0.0680 0.1340 0.2000
5 0.5868 0.8234 1.0807 1.3482
Mmax 10 0.4692 0.8106 1.1722 1.5424
15 0.4084 0.8205 1.2510 1.6888
20 0.3698 0.8367 1.3200 1.8097
The reason for looking at all at the crude bound of the corollary is that its
calculation only uses values for λ and Mmax; the exact critical value kc,o nt h e
other hand, requires calculation of M∗, which in turn requires that the entire κ(M)
function be speciﬁed. The numbers in the above table were calculated for a κ(M)
d e r i v e df r o maP a r e t od i s t r i b u t i o nw i t har a t i oo fm e d i a nt om e a nc a p i t a lo f0.30.
2.4 A comparison with Benhabib
Benhabib [1] examines a static model in which natives derive income from the supply
of labor and capital to a neoclassical production sector. Natives’ preferences over
immigration derive from immigrants’ impact on income. As noted above, Benhabib’s
immigrants are heterogeneous in their capital-holdings, with a distribution F (k) of
capital-holdings, with associated density f (k). A policy in Benhabib’s model is a
choice of ‘cut-oﬀ’v a l u e s ,l and u ≥ l, such that the economy admits all immigrants
with capital-holdings in the interval [l,u]. A policy implies both a level of immigra-




Our assumptions on κ(M) w o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt oﬁxing u =+ ∞ in Benhabib’s
framework, and considering only a choice of l.I nt e r m so fad i s t r i b u t i o no fi m m i g r a n t
capital, our κ(M) could be deﬁned as κ(M)=
R +∞
l kf (k)dk,w h e r el is such that
M = F (+∞) − F (l). In other words, if we denote F (+∞), the total number of





Our assumption of strict concavity is natural in light of this construction, since




f [F−1 (Mmax − M)]
.
In fact, in some of our numerical experiments, we construct κ(M) in precisely
this way. For example if F is a Pareto-type distribution, then κ(M) has the form of
a concave power function of M.I fF is a log-normal distribution, then κ(M) has the
form B [1 − N (ω − σ)],w h e r eN is the standard normal C.D.F. and ω is such that
M/Mmax =1− N (ω). The parameter σ is the standard deviation of the logarithm
of immigrant capital, and B depends on Mmax, σ and the mean of the logarithm of
immigrant capital.
In any case, our κ(M) is obviously a restriction relative to Benhabib’s more
general policies. However, we do not believe that it is a serious one. As we have shown
above, natives in our two-period economy prefer to either minimize or maximize the
subsequent period’s capital-ratio, with–under reasonable parameters–a majority
preferring to maximize. If we took Benhabib’s more general notion of a policy, the
economy’s policy choice would ultimately boil down to one between a minimizing
8policy of the form [0,u], for a particular, common value of u, or a maximizing policy
of the form [l,+∞), for a particular, common value of l. In general, for reasonable
environments, we expect the latter type of policy to prevail.7
At the same time, the dynamic nature of our economy–in particular, the fact
that agents are maximizing lifetime utilities rather than static income–gives rise to
phenomena not possible within Benhabib’s framework, namely a dependence of im-
migration policy on the growth rate of technology (which we incorporate below) and
the potential for multiple steady state equilibria. While our exploration of the posi-
tive ramiﬁcations of these sorts of behaviors is still preliminary, both of these features
seem ap r i o r iimportant to us, if models of this sort are to come close to explaining
patterns we see in real-world policies. Our sense is that native demographics do not
diﬀer suﬃciently, either across countries or over time, to fully explain diﬀerences in
immigration policies (both across countries and over time). In our introduction, we
noted the disparate immigration policies adopted by several otherwise similar coun-
tries. Thinking about variation over time in the policy of a single country, in a model
such as ours–or that of Benhabib–policy doesn’t vary smoothly with population
characteristics; rather, rising or falling inequality has no eﬀect on immigration policy
until a critical threshold is passed, at which point an abrupt swing in policy occurs.
Perhaps this is a feature of the real world (the Australian experience comes to mind
in this respect); still, one would hope for a model which predicts some ‘smooth’ vari-
ation in policy, since not all changes in most countries’ immigration policies take the
form of a sudden opening or closing of the doors.8
3 An overlapping generations model
In this section, we extend the basic two-period model elaborated above to an over-
lapping generations setting with two-period-lived agents. One important diﬀerence
from the model above is that production will take place in every period and, in con-
trast to most Diamond-type OLG models, we will assume our agents supply labor
and capital to ﬁrms in both periods of their lives.
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2.... A tt h es t a r to fe a c hp e r i o dt,a
measure one of young natives is born. Each young native is endowed with 1 unit
of labor and some amount of capital, k. The capital endowment is idiosyncratic,
and there is a distribution µ with
R
µ(dk)=1 .W el e t¯ k denote the average capital
endowment of young natives. At each date t also, a measure Mt of immigrants arrive
(where Mt =0is possible, depending on policy). Immigrants are two-period-lived
as well, and are assumed to arrive young. Each new immigrant also has 1 unit of
labor and some amount of capital, k, to supply. Capital endowments vary across
immigrants, and we continue to let κ(M) again denote the total amount of capital
brought by immigrants when the number of immigrants admitted is M.9 We assume
that immigration is one-way, so that Mt young immigrants at t become Mt old citizens
at t+1. The population at any date t ≥ 1 is then Lt =( 1+Mt−1)+(1+Mt),w h e r e
the ﬁrst term consists of old agents at t and the second, young agents at t.10
7To be certain, however, our computational programs explicitly allow for the possibility that the
K/L-minimizing choice is the majoritarian winner; this outcome never occured in the parametriza-
tions which we examined.
8Even in regard to the last major round of ‘door closing’–at the end of the ﬁrst great wave of
globalization which took place from the middle of the 19th century through to the early part of the
20th century–Timmer and Williamson [5] note that this closure was a gradual process, rather than
an abrupt one. On the other hand, as an empirical matter, the main factor which they ﬁnd to have
prompted this closure was rising inequality in the main recipient countries of the New World.
9For now, we assume that κ(·),l i k eµ(·), is constant over time.
10The population at t =0consists of a mass of young agents, with some average capital holdings.
9All young agents, whether natives or new immigrants, face the same decision
problem. Young agents supply labor and capital to the production sector at compet-
itively determined real wage and rental rates. Income from the supply of factors of
production is divided between current consumption and savings (next-period’s cap-
ital). In the subsequent period, the agent consumes his or her income from savings
(i.e., the rental on the agent’s capital), plus income from the supply of labor.
Letting ct denote consumption of a young agent at date t, st+1 savings by a young
agent for period t +1 , dt+1 consumption of an old agent at t +1 ,a n dwt and rt the
wage and rental rates, a young agent at t, who is endowed initially with k units of
capital, faces the following budget constraints:
wt + rtk = ct + st+1
and
dt+1 = rt+1st+1 + wt+1.
Agents are assumed to have preferences of the time-additive, logarithmic form
U (ct,d t+1)=l o g( ct)+β log(dt+1).
With these assumptions on tastes and opportunities, the behavior of a typical










Then, aggregate capital in period t +1will be the sum of savings by the young
generation at t, plus the capital endowments of the new generation of natives born at














+ ¯ k + κ(Mt+1).
As in our two-period model, production takes place within a representative ﬁrm










where Lt+1 =( 1+Mt)+( 1+Mt+1) is the total population at t +1 . Substituting







wt (1 + Mt)+rt
¡¯ k + κ(Mt)
¢¤
+ α(1 + β)
£¯ k + κ(Mt+1)
¤
(1 + αβ)(1+Mt)+α(1 + β)(1+Mt+1)
.( 7 )
For convenience, let z denote the capital-labor ratio, and note that wt and rt can
both be expressed in terms of zt.T h e p e r i o d - t +1capital-labor ratio can then be
seen to depend on Mt+1, zt and Mt.L e tξ (Mt+1;zt,M t) stand for the expression on
the right-hand side of (7), when wt =( 1− α)Azα
t and rt = αAzα−1
t . Then, (7) may
be expressed as:
zt+1 = ξ (Mt+1;zt,M t).( 8 )
These young consist of natives plus some (possibly zero) number of ‘original’ immigrants.
10Let
π(z,M)=m a x
M0 {ξ (M0;z,M):0≤ M0 ≤ Mmax}
and
φ(z,M) = argmax
M0 {ξ (M0;z,M):0≤ M0 ≤ Mmax}.
If immigration for period-t +1is chosen to maximize the period-t +1capital-labor
ratio, given period t’s capital-labor ratio and level of immigration, then the evolution
of this economy over time has the following simple description:
zt+1 = π(zt,M t) (9)
Mt+1 = φ(zt,M t).( 1 0 )
One can show that the ﬁrst-order conditions for choosing M0 to maximize ξ (M0;z,M)
imply that
κ0 (M∗)=ξ (M∗;z,M).
Thus, when zt and Mt follow the dynamic system above, we will have at every date
that
κ0 (Mt+1)=ξ (Mt+1;zt,M t)=zt+1.
Implicitly, the two-dimensional system above can be reduced to the one-dimensional
system
Mt+1 = φ(κ0 (Mt),M t) ≡ ψ(Mt).( 1 1 )
4 Numerical results
The dynamic system underlying this economy consists of a pair of non-trivial non-
linear equations. As such, it is diﬃcult to characterize, analytically, both the steady
states and transitional dynamics of the economy. However, it is straightforward to
utilize numerical methods to enhance our understanding of the model.
In what follows, we assume that κ(M) has the form of a smooth concave power
function–κ(M)=BMθ. This is in fact that the κ(M) which would arise if immi-
grant capital had a Pareto distribution.11 The examples below diﬀer in their values
of θ and B, but share a common set of core parameters: α = .3, β = .7 and ¯ k,t h e
mean native capital endowment, equal to 1.
4.1 Steady states
4.1.1 An economy with a unique steady state equilibrium
In this economy, we set B =1 .25 and θ = .31. The underlying Pareto distribution of
immigrant wealth for these parameter values is one characterized by a ratio of median
immigrant capital to mean immigrant capital of 0.50–i.e., a moderate degree of
inequality, comparable to the US–and a fairly low ratio of mean immigrant capital
to mean native capital, assuming the potential immigrant population is large.12 The
11We have obtained qualitatively similar results with the somewhat less tractable lognormal dis-
tribution.
12The underlying Pareto distribution with mass Mmax has three parameters (including Mmax).
The B and θ in κ(M)=BMθ are functions of these underlying parameters. There’s a one-to-one
relationship between θ and the degree of inequality in the distribution (whether measured with the
median-mean ratio or Gini coeﬃcient), θ =0 .31 corresponds to a median-mean ratio of 0.50.G i v e n
that ratio, a given value of B, however, corresponds to a locus of pairs of possible means and total
masses for the distribution; so, for example, B =1 .25 is consistent with a plausible Mmax =1 1and
a small mean capital-holding of 0.24 the size of the mean native caital-holding. It is also consistent,
h o w e v e r ,w i t hav e r ys m a l l ,v e r yr i c hp o t e n t i a li m m i g r a n tp o o l – e.g., a pool of immigrants of half
the size of the native population with twice the average wealth is also consistent with B =1 .25.
11inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations economy of the last section gives rise to a
dynamic system that can be described succinctly by equations (9) and (10). The
economy has two state variables in any period: the capital-labor ratio (zt),a n d
the level of immigration (Mt). This economy has a unique steady state, and it is
straightforward to show that from any initial condition in the z −M plane, that the
economy converges to this unique steady state.
Figure 1 shows how the choice of next-period’s level of immigration depends on
t h ec u r r e n ts t a t ev a r i a b l e s – i.e., it is a graphical representation of equation (10).
Generally, the level of immigration (Mt+1) is increasing in the level of immigration
in the previous period (Mt). What this means is that, holding ﬁxed the capital-labor
ratio zt (or, equivalently, the current factor prices wt and rt), high immigration in
the previous period implies high immigration in the current period. In terms of
the underlying maximization problem which Mt+1 solves, the eﬀects of Mt on the
choice of Mt+1 are quite complex. Intuitively, though, the marginal beneﬁto fab i t
more immigration is the extra capital it implies, while the marginal cost is the extra
labor over which the capital stock must be spread. One can show mathematically
that an increase in Mt has a clear negative eﬀect on the marginal beneﬁto fn e x t -
period’s immigration–since the eﬀect on the capital-labor ratio of a bit more capital
is smaller the larger the population is. At the same time, an increase in Mt has
an ap r i o r iambiguous eﬀect on the marginal cost of next-period’s immigration–on
the one hand, more people around to start with lowers the marginal impact on the
capital-labor ratio of adding few more, but at the same time more people to start
with means a bit more aggregate savings (and capital) to equip those few more with.
Apparently, for the parameters in this experiment, an increase in Mt ends up lowering
the marginal cost of Mt+1, and by more than it lowers the corresponding marginal
beneﬁt.
While the next-period’s immigration decision is monotonic in current immigra-
tion, it is apparent from the diagram that the immigration decision is not monotonic
in the current capital-labor ratio. If the current capital-labor ratio is relatively low,
then the number of desired immigrants is increasing in the level of zt.T os e ew h y ,
think of next period’s capital-labor ratio as a convex combination of per capita sav-
ings by the currently young, plus per capita capital of next period’s immigrants and
next period’s young generation; increasing next period’s immigration, other things
the same, reduces the weight placed on per capita savings by the current young.
Now, when the capital-labor is suﬃciently low, an increase in the capital-labor ra-
tio will reduce the per capita savings of the current young, because it reduces the
return to saving. This makes it worthwhile to increase next-period’s immigration a
bit (increasing the weight on the capital of the newcomers and reducing the weight
on capital supplied by the current young). Conversely, if the current capital-labor
ratio is high, increases in it will increase the per capita savings of the current young,
because it raises wages. This makes it worthwhile to decrease next-period’s immigra-
tion a bit. Hence, the decision rule for next-period’s immigration is, at higher levels
of zt, decreasing in zt.
Figure 2 illustrates how the capital-labor ratio in the subsequent period (zt+1) is a
function of the current capital-labor ratio (zt) a n dt h el e v e lo fi m m i g r a t i o nt h i sp e r i o d
(Mt)–i.e.,t h eﬁgure plots equation (9). The optimal next-period capital-labor ratio
is a decreasing function of the current level of immigration. From a purely formal
standpoint, this property is equivalent to the positive dependence of Mt+1 on Mt,
which we described above. To see the connection, recall that the ﬁrst-order condition
for a maximizing choice of Mt+1 can be written as κ0 (Mt+1)=ξ (Mt+1;zt,M t).
G i v e nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nMt leads to an increase in Mt+1–and that fact that
12κ0 (Mt+1) i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fMt+1–it follows that an increase in Mt must
lower ξ (Mt+1;zt,M t)–i.e., zt+1–at the optimal choice of Mt+1. Intuitively, it must
be the case that, for these particular model parameters, the positive impact which
a higher value of Mt has on aggregate native savings is insuﬃcient to oﬀset the fact
that capital must be spread over a larger number of persons.
Although it is not obvious in the diagram, the choice of zt+1 is not monotonic in
zt–for small values of zt, the capital-labor ratio zt+1 is decreasing in zt, while for
larger values of zt, zt+1 is increasing in zt.A sw i t ht h ee ﬀect of zt on Mt+1, the non-
monotonicity here is due to the fact that increasing zt will decrease the per capita
savings of the current young when zt is small, and increase the per capita savings of
the current young when zt is large. In particular, at low levels of the capital-labor
ratio, an increase in this ratio in the current period reduces the level of domestic
saving by the young because it lowers the rate of return to capital. This eﬀect
can only be partially oﬀset through immigration of immigrants who are suﬃciently
wealthy, but the net eﬀect is a lower capital-labor ratio next period. However, at high
levels of the current period’s capital-labor ratio, further increases in this ratio raise
the subsequent period’s capital-labor ratio. This is because of the fact that, while a
rise in the current capital-labor ratio lowers the return to capital, this is oﬀset by an
increase in this period’s wage, and some of this wage is then saved for the following
period.
4.1.2 An economy with multiple steady states
In this section we consider slightly diﬀerent parameter values, letting θ = .74 and
B = .455. The underlying distribution of immigrant capital associated with these
parameters features a very low degree of wealth inequality and–assuming a large
pool of potential immigrants–a fairly low mean relative to the average native capital-
holding.13 This economy has three steady states, labelled ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ in Figure 3.
These correspond, respectively, to high, intermediate and low levels of immigration.
The dynamics of this economy are quite interesting, since A and C are locally stable,
or “sinks”. The equilibrium at B, however, is saddle-path stable, though in an odd
way. In particular, if the economy begins at points above or below the locus labelled
XY, it converges to either A or C; if it begins at any point on XY, then it converges to
point B–but in one step. What’s going on? Let MB denote the level of immigration
associated with the equilibrium B; then, the locus of points XY is precisely the set
of pairs (z,M) such that MB solves max ˜ M ξ( ˜ M;z,M).
Of course, these three equilibria are associated with diﬀerent behavior. The steady
state equilibrium at A features a very high level of immigration and a low capital-
labor ratio while the opposite is true at C. Note that since equilibrium (z,M) pairs
obey the ﬁrst-order condition κ0 (Mt+1)=zt+1–and given the assumed concavity of
κ(·)–it will always be the case in this model that trajectories (and their limiting
values) lie along a downward-sloping locus in z − M space.14
While this example is only meant to be illustrative of the possible behavior of
the model–in particular, we wouldn’t consider our parametrization, at this stage, to
constitute a careful calibration of the model’s parameters–it’s worth pointing out
that, in terms of output per person, two otherwise identical economies which have
ended up at A and C will not look that diﬀerent. The capital-labor ratio at A is
about half that at C, implying that per capita GDP at A is about 81% of per capita
13The main diﬀerence is the degree of inequality–the median-mean ratio in this example is 0.88
versus 0.50 previously. For an immigrant pool that encompasses the vertical axis in Figure 3–
say, Mmax =2 0 –the immigrant-mean-to-native-mean ratio is somewhat smaller than that in the
previous example (a mean-mean ratio of about 0.21 versus 0.24 in the previous example).
14Except possibly at t =0 .
13GDP at C–about the standing of an Australia or Denmark relative to the US.15
If the initial conditions (z0,M 0) are such that M0 is ‘optimal’ given z0 (or vice
versa)–that is to say, if the ﬁrst order condition κ0 (M0)=z0 holds–then the dy-
namics of the economy can be expressed as one-dimensional, as in equation (11). That









,i fz0 = κ0 (M0),w eh a v eMt+1 =a r gm a x˜ M ξ( ˜ M;κ0 (Mt),M t) ≡ ψ(Mt)
for all t.16 The three steady states from Figure 3 can also be seen in Figure 4, which
plots ψ(Mt) − Mt (i.e., Mt+1 − Mt plotted against Mt). One can also see in this
representation the stability of the low and high steady states and the instability of
the middle steady state.
As one might guess–given that the only diﬀerence between our unique and mul-
tiple steady state examples is the choice of θ and B–whether an economy has one or
more steady states depends on these parameters of the κ(M) function (which ulti-
mately derives from a distribution of potential immigrants’ capital). Figure 5 shows
part of the parameter space, with values of B on the horizontal axis and values of
θ on the vertical axis. The dark region corresponds to (B,θ) pairs for which the
economy has three steady states, just as in the example of this section. Outside the
dark region, the economy has a unique steady state. Along the knife-edge set of
parameters which makes up the boundary of the dark shaded region, there are two
steady states–at which either the ‘low’ and ‘middle’ equilibria or the ‘middle’ and
‘high’ equilibria collapse into a single point.
How can we interpret these results? The parameters θ and B of κ(M)=BMθ
have an interpretation in terms of an underlying distribution of capital among poten-
tial immigrants, in particular this form for κ(M) arises when the distribution is of
the Pareto type. Since the total mass of potential immigrants is Mmax, rather than
one, the distribution has three parameters, including Mmax itself. If we ﬁx Mmax,
then there is a one-to-one correspondence between B and θ on the one hand and the
underlying distribution’s mean and degree of inequality on the other. For example,
specifying the Gini coeﬃcient of the underlying distribution and the mean potential
immigrant capital-holding implies a particular (θ,B) pair; likewise, specifying a θ
and B implies a particular Gini coeﬃcient and mean for the underlying distribution.
Thus, we can map the region of multiple steady state equilibria shown in terms of
θ and B in ﬁgure 5 into a region in the space of Gini coeﬃcients and mean capital-
holdings. Higher values of θ correspond to smaller degrees of inequality, independent
of B.I fw eﬁx Mmax at 10, for example, then the range of θ’s in ﬁgure 5 for which
there are multiple steady state equilibria (θ ∼ = .73 to θ = .9) corresponds to Ginis
which run from about .16 down to about .05–in other words, a very low degree
of inequality. The mean of the distribution is determined jointly by B and θ; ﬁxing
Mmax again at 10, the range of means in the shaded area of Figure 5 is from (roughly)
.07 to .15. Since the mean native capital endowment has been normalized to one,
these values correspond to pools of potential immigrants whose mean capital-holding
ranges from 7% to 15% of the average native’s capital endowment. Figure 6 shows
the region of multiplicity from ﬁgure 5, mapped into the space of Ginis and ratios of
immigrant mean capital to native mean capital, assuming Mmax =1 0 .
15The calculation assumes identical Cobb-Douglas technologies for the two countries, with capi-
tal’s share, α,e q u a lt o0.30.
16Even if z0 and M0 are not related in this way, (11) will govern the economy’s dynamics after
the initial period.
144.2 The eﬀects of exogenous technological change
Consider modifying the model presented above to incorporate exogenous technologi-
cal progress. What consequence would changes in the economy’s technological growth
rate have on the path of immigration? In particular, in this section we assume that
the economy’s production technology in period t is
Ft (K,L)=AKα (XtL)
1−α ,
where Xt =( 1 + γ)
t. In order to have balanced growth in this economy of two-
period lived agents we also assume that agents’ endowments of capital grow at rate
γ as well–so that the average endowment of a native born at t is now (1 + γ)
t ¯ k and
the total capital brought by Mt immigrants is (1 + γ)
t κ(Mt). This leads to a minor
modiﬁcation of the equations describing the evolution of immigration, Mt,a n dt h e
capital-labor ratio, zt.
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With our new assumptions on the economy’s technology, the wage and rental rate
are given by
wt =( 1− α)AKα
t (XtLt)
















Let ˜ zt ≡ Kt/XtLt. Then,
˜ zt+1 =
αβ (1 + γ)
−1 £
(1 − α)A˜ zα
t (1 + Mt)+αA˜ z
α−1
t
¡¯ k + κ(Mt)
¢¤
+ α(1 + β)
£¯ k + κ(Mt+1)
¤
(1 + αβ)(1+Mt)+α(1 + β)(1+Mt+1)
,
or
˜ zt+1 = ˜ ξ (Mt+1;˜ zt,M t),
where the function ˜ ξ (M0;z,M) is otherwise identical to ξ (M0;z,M) but for the
(1 + γ)
−1 in the ﬁrst term in the numerator. As before, natives’ utilities depend on
immigration only through factor prices, which in turn depend on the capital-‘eﬀective
labor’ ratio ˜ z. The same arguments applied above imply that Mt+1 will be chosen
to maximize ˜ zt+1,a sMt+1 had been chosen previously to maximize zt+1.
Note that, other things equal, an increase in γ will increase the ˜ zt+1-maximizing
choice of Mt+1, for given values of ˜ zt and Mt.17 As a result, changes in the path of
technological change can alter the path of immigration levels, with an increase in the
17˜ ξ (Mt+1;˜ zt,M t),l i k e ξ (Mt+1;zt,M t), is hump-shaped, and has the form
(a + bκ(Mt+1))/(c + dMt+1);a ni n c r e a s ei nγ is the same as lowering the value of a in
this expression. A lower value of a would increase the marginal incremement (or reduce the
marginal decrement) in the capital-eﬀective-labor ratio from a small increase in Mt+1 at any
value of Mt+1 (and ˜ zt and Mt, as well). Note that this conclusion would still obtain even if total
immigrant capital grew at a rate diﬀerent from technology and mean native capital, though in that
case ˜ ξ would be time-varying, with either a growing or declining marginal beneﬁtf r o mi m m i g r a t i o n ,
depending on whether total immigrant capital was growing faster or slower than technology and
capital in the native economy.
15speed of technological advance leading to larger inﬂows of immigrants and slowdowns
in the pace of technological change leading to smaller immigrant inﬂows. This is in
contrast to the result in Benhabib’s static model, in which immigration outcomes are
invariant to any changes in the level of technology.
Figure 7 illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in γ for an example economy. Here
γ increases from 2% g r o w t hp e ry e a rt o3% g r o w t hp e ry e a r( am o d e lp e r i o di s
taken to be ten years, reﬂected in the choice of the discount factor β). The pool
of potential immigrants in this example has a size of Mmax =1 1 , and they are
fairly poor on average (their mean capital-holding is 30% of natives’ ¯ k)a n dt h e i r
distribution of wealth is fairly skewed (with a median-to-mean ratio of 30%). The
eﬀect of the increase in γ is fairly modest–resulting in a roughly 0.5 increase in
the percent of foreign born agents in the economy. While this example is merely
meant to be illustrative of one of the mechanisms at work in this model, dependence
of the equilibrium immigration outcome on factors other than the demographics
of the voting population is potentially quite important. One apparent drawback of
voting models of immigration policy is the invariance of the policy outcome to all but
very large changes in native demographics; moreover, when policy does change, the
change is quite large, with an economy often swinging from admitting large numbers
of immigrants to admitting very few or none.18 While such models may be good for
explaining episodes in which hithertofore ‘closed’ economies ‘open their doors’–or
conversely, ‘open’ economies ‘shut their doors’–such episodes, while signiﬁcant, are
also quite infrequent. A responsiveness of policy to productivity growth may provide
an explanation for the smaller, more frequent changes in policy which we observe in
many economies.19
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple dynamic model of the determination of immigra-
tion policy, under the assumptions that immigrants are heterogeneous in terms of
wealth and that policy is decided by majoritarian means.
Depending on the distribution of wealth of the pool of potential immigrants–
in our experiments, the degree of inequality in the distribution, the relation of its
mean to the mean native capital-holding, and its total size–the model can yield a
unique stable steady state equilibrium or multiple stable steady state equilibria. The
model also predicts a positive relationship between the recipient country’s rate of
technological progress and the size of its immigrant inﬂows.
Obviously, much remains to be done. In particular, we have not attempted a care-
ful calibration of the model’s parameters to the situation of any particular country
(and its corresponding pool of potential immigrants). While we have tried to argue
that the conditions under which the main voting result hold plausibly ﬁtt h es i t u a -
tion of the US vis-à-vis the less-developed world, this is no substitute for a careful
empirical investigation of the model.
Also, the model only explores one dimension of heterogeneity, that being in terms
of wealth, or capital. An important avenue for further work, in our view, is the
incorporation of other dimensions of heterogeneity, particularly in terms of human
capital, or skills.
18See our [3] for some results of this form.
19E.g., the U.S.–and many other countries–experienced a long period of ‘openness’ up to the
early part of the 20th century, followed by several decades of relative closure to immigration, with
a return to openness again in recent decades. (See, for example, [4].) Between these major policy
shifts, there has always been some minor policy change taking place–see the INS’s website, in
particular http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/LegisHist/index.htm for a sum-
mary of 142 legislative acts pertaining to immigration since 1790.
16A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the critical value kc
A native with capital k has preferences over ξ given by
vk (ξ)=( 1+β)log(αk +( 1− α)ξ) − β (1 − α)log(ξ).
For ξ ∈ (0,+∞), vk (ξ) is diﬀerentiable, with
v0
k (ξ)=
(1 + β)(1− α)
αk +( 1− α)ξ
−











It follows that vk (ξ) has the ‘∪-shape’ claimed above. Note that ξk is the capital-
labor ratio which would obtain, absent immigration, if native k were the only, or
average, individual in economy.
A native with capital k of section 2 prefers ξ
∗ to ξ∗ if and only if vk (ξ
∗) >v k (ξ∗).
Assuming that ξ∗ 6=0 , a little algebra shows that vk (ξ
∗) >v k (ξ∗) if and only if
αk +( 1− α)ξ
∗
























where η ≡ β (1 − α)/(1 + β). The expression on the right is the critical level of
capital, kc, described in section 2.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose that κ(M) is diﬀerentiable; then ξ (M), the capital-labor ratio for a given
M,i sa l s od i ﬀerentiable, with ξ
0 (M) > 0 if and only if
κ0 (M)
αβ¯ k + α(1 + β)κ(M)
>
1
1+αβ + α(1 + β)M
.
Equivalently, ξ







[κ(M) − Mκ0 (M)].( 1 2 )
If κ00 (M) < 0, the left-hand side of this inequality is continuous and strictly de-





¯ k>κ0 (Mmax),( 1 3 )
and κ(0) = 0, it follows that there is a unique M∗ ∈ (0,M max) with ξ
0 (M∗)=0and
ξ
0 (M) > 0 for M<M ∗ and ξ
0 (M) < 0 for M>M ∗.20
20The ﬁrst inequality in (13) means that the left-hand side of (12) exceeds the right-hand side at
M =0 , while the second in equality in (13) implies the opposite at M = Mmax.T os e et h i s ,n o t e
that κ0 (M) > 0, κ00 (M) < 0 and κ(0) = 0 together imply κ(M) >M κ0 (M) > 0 for all M>0.




− ¯ Mκ0 ¡ ¯ M
¢
> 0 shows the suﬃciency of the second for its purpose.
17Since ξ (M) is ‘hump-shaped’, the value of M which minimizes ξ (M)–i.e.,w h i c h
attains ξ∗–is either M =0or M = Mmax. Note that if κ(0) = 0,t h e n
ξ (0) =








αβ¯ k + α(1 + β)κ(Mmax)
1+αβ + α(1 + β)Mmax
.






¯ k,( 1 4 )
while ξ (0) ≤ ξ (Mmax) if the opposite inequality holds. It follows that ξ (Mmax)=ξ∗
when (14) holds, and ξ (0) = ξ∗ when the opposite inequality holds. At ﬁrst glance,
it might seem that if the pool of potential immigrants is large and, on average,
relatively poor compared to natives, we would then expect (14) to hold readily–
i.e., the second-period capital-labor ratio would be minimized when all potential
immigrants are admitted. However, if the period length is long (so that the discount
factor β is correspondingly small) [αβ/(1 + αβ)]¯ k could be a quite small fraction of
average native capital, in which case the opposite inequality might hold. If that is
the case, ξ∗ is attained at M =0 .






if median native capital satisﬁed km ≤ [(1 + αβ)/αβ]ξ∗ we could conclude that a
majority of natives preferred M∗ to any other value of M.
This bound depends on the minimized capital-labor ratio ξ∗, and as Proposition
1 shows, this may correspond to either zero immigration or the maximum allowable,
Mmax, depending on whether κ(Mmax)/Mmax is greater or less than [αβ/(1 + αβ)]¯ k.
When κ(Mmax)/Mmax > [αβ/(1 + αβ)] ¯ k, ξ∗ is attained at M∗ =0 ,a n dt h i n g st u r n
out to be particularly simple. In that case, ξ∗ = ξ (0) = [αβ/(1 + αβ)]¯ k, so that the




ξ∗ = ¯ k
–i.e., the critical level of capital, below which everyone prefers M∗, is at least as big
as the average level of native capital. Thus, in this case everyone from the mean on
down prefers M∗. If, as seems a natural assumption, the distribution of native initial
capital is right-skewed, with km < ¯ k, it is immediate that a majority of natives share
M∗ as a unique preferred policy.
When ξ∗ = ξ (Mmax), things are more complicated. In that case–recalling the








αβ¯ k + α(1 + β)κ(Mmax)
1+αβ + α(1 + β)Mmax
¶
.
If the median native’s capital holding were less than or equal to this quantity, we
could again conclude that a majority of natives shared M∗ as a common preferred
point.
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